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Greatness and Limits of the West 
The History of an Unfinished Project 
 
I am honoured to stand before you today at the London School of Economics 
to deliver the first annual Ralf Dahrendorf Memorial Lecture. Ralf 
Dahrendorf, you see, was one of my professors at the University of Tübingen, 
where, fifty years ago, I was once a student. In the summer semester of 1961, 
Dahrendorf held a lecture course on the social theory of revolution, and it 
proved to be one of the most brilliant I would attend during my student days. 
Inspired by the man, I devoured his books in short order. Among them was 
Society and Democracy in Germany. Besides establishing Dahrendorf’s 
reputation in the Federal Republic, this book would provide much inspiration 
for my own work on German history and its deviations from the West. Our 
paths crossed again at Harvard University, in the legendary year of 1968. He 
was a visiting professor, and I was a John F. Kennedy Memorial Fellow. Our 
next meeting didn’t come until the new millennium. In 2000, I published my 
two-volume work Germany: The Long Road West, where I cite Dahrendorf 
extensively. Not long after the book appeared, Dahrendorf contacted me and 
suggested we meet sometime to talk. The conversation we had was long and 
fruitful. 
My lecture today is not about Ralf Dahrendorf but about an issue that was 
central to his work: the normative project of the West. Throughout his life, 
Dahrendorf witnessed various manifestations of the West in Europe and in 
the United States. In a May 2003 lecture co-sponsored by the German 
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Historical Institute London titled “Europe and the West: Old and New 
Identities,” he warned against seeing in the European Union a counterweight 
to the United States. Dahrendorf was a transatlantic thinker, and even if we 
did not always agree—about European integration or the Iraq War, say—we 
always converged on a fundamental point: that which holds the West 
together at its core is an eighteenth-century idea developed on both sides of 
the Atlantic: namely, the idea of a free order built on the rule of law.  
My talk today is about the preconditions and consequences of the West’s 
normative project. I would like to start with a quick sketch of the concept 
itself, for in both its cultural and political senses the “West” has meant 
different things at different times. The opposition that existed in classical 
Greece between the Hellenic and the barbaric, the Occident (what the Greeks 
called hespéra or dysmaí) and the Orient (what the Greeks called anatolé) 
grew out of experiences gathered during the Persian Wars in the first half of 
the fifth century BC. In the Christian regions of Europe, the word “Occident” 
referred to the domain of the Western Church, which is to say the Latin 
Church, as opposed to the domain of the Greek Church, which is to say 
Byzantium. On the transatlantic front, the West was rarely thought of as a 
unity prior to the twentieth century. Only after 1890, when North America 
was seen to have attained cultural and political parity with Europe, did the 
concept enter general circulation, particularly in the Anglo-Saxon world. At 
that time, of course, it still had to compete with another, more dominant 
concept, namely, that of the white race. The idea of the West was both 
narrower and broader than the race-based notion of community. It was 
narrower because it excluded the Russian and Balkan parts of Europe, which 
were deemed behind the times; but it was also broader because membership 
in Western civilization was not predicated on blood. 
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For one Western country, the concept of the West was, for a while, a fighting 
word. In the First World War, Germany associated the “West” with France, 
Great Britain, and, once it entered the conflict, the United States. From the 
viewpoint of Germany’s nationalist defenders, Thomas Mann among them, 
these countries stood for the very values that Germany rejected: democratic 
majority rule and materialism. Germany, by contrast, stood for the superior 
values of an inward-looking culture founded on a strong state.1 In many 
minds, the battle between the German ideas of 1914 and the Western ideas of 
1789 persisted even after the defeat of 1918. The most egregious moment of 
Germany’s revolt against the political culture of the West was National 
Socialism. Only after the defeat of the German Reich in World War II did 
Germany—one part of it, at least—seek to integrate itself with the West. At 
the height of the Historikerstreit, the 1980s dispute among German historians 
about the uniqueness of the Nazi genocide, Jürgen Habermas called this 
“unreserved opening of the Federal Republic to the political culture of the 
West” the most important intellectual achievement of postwar Germany. 2  
During the Cold War, the “West” became shorthand for NATO: the alliance of 
the two major democracies of North America with ten—later it would become 
fourteen—countries on the other side of the Atlantic, including, starting in 
1955, the Federal Republic of Germany. Not all the NATO countries were 
democracies, of course. Before 1974, Portugal was ruled by a rightwing 
authoritarian dictatorship, while Greece and Turkey were run by the military, 
at times directly, at times indirectly. Despite exceptions like these, however, 
NATO saw itself as a defender of civil rights and human rights against the 
                                                        
1 See Thomas Mann, Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen (1918), in Gesammelte Werke in dreizehn 
Bänden, (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer, 1990), 12: 1 – 589. 
2 Jürgen Habermas, “A Kind of Settlement of Damages: On Apologetic Tendencies in German 
History Writing,” in Forever In the Shadow of Hitler? trans. James Knowlton and Truett Cates 
(Atlantic Highlands, N.J., Humanities Press, 1993), 42–43 [34–44]. 
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threat of the Soviet Union and the states of the Warsaw Pact. NATO aspired 
to more than a military alliance: it also wanted to build a community of 
values.  
After the epochal changes in 1989 and 1991, the concept of the West changed 
once more. The fall of the communist dictatorship permitted geographic and 
historical realities to come into focus that had been long obscured by the Cold 
War. Before the middle of the twentieth century, few if any would have 
assigned Poland, Hungary, or the regions of Czechoslovakia to “Eastern 
Europe.” “Central Europe” and “East Central Europe” were, and still are, the 
accurate terms. The term “Eastern Europe” was reserved for Russia east of the 
Ural Mountains, for White Russia, and for large parts the Ukraine. 
Historically, East Central Europe, the Baltic region, and the western part of 
the Ukraine belonged to the Occident, a region whose spiritual centre was, 
until the Reformation, located in Rome, in contrast to Orthodox-influenced 
Eastern Europe. 
No one expresses the difference between Europe and the West as incisively as 
the Viennese historian Gerald Stourzh when he writes, “By itself, Europe is 
not the West. The West extends beyond Europe. But Europe also extends 
beyond the West.”3 The non-European West includes the United States and 
Canada, as well as Australia and New Zealand and, since its founding in 
1948, Israel. In Europe things are more complicated. How it came to pass that 
only part of Europe was considered part of the West has its answer in the time 
that preceded the split into a Western Church and an Eastern Church. The 
question is not only of historical interest. It goes back to common cultural 
                                                        
3 Gerald Stourzh, “Statt eines Vorworts: Europa, aber wo liegt es?” in Annäherung an eine 
europäische Geschichtsschreibung, ed. Gerald Stourzh  (Vienna: Austrian Academy of Sciences 
Press, 2002), xi. 
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influences that once connected Europe and which continue to have an effect 
today. 
The strongest of these common influences is the Christian religion. 
Considering the ever decreasing importance of the Church and Christianity in 
Europe, this claim is everything but obvious. A professed secularist might 
even see it as an attempt to question secularization itself. In reality, it is the 
uniqueness of secularization in the West—unparalleled in human history—
that should make us want to understand its religious roots. 
We can only speak coherently about the Christian heritage of Europe and the 
West if we include the Jewish heritage of Christianity as well. Central to the 
Jewish heritage is monotheism, whose history predates Judaism. In the 
fourteenth-century BC, the Egyptian king Amenhotep IV declared the sun 
deity Aten to be the one and only god. (Akhenaten, the name he later gave 
himself, means “servant of Aten.”) Egyptian monotheism turned out to be just 
an episode but it had an enduring effect on its Mosaic counterpart. The 
advantage of monotheism was that it provided a theological answer to the 
question of the creator and humankind’s relation to Him, a question for which 
polytheism offered no rational explanation. Jewish monotheism hence 
signified a significant shift toward rationalization, civilization, and 
intellectualization. 
A specific feature of Jewish monotheism is the promise of messianic salvation 
for the elected people. Early Christianity stood in the tradition of Hellenistic 
Judaism, where hopes were pinned not on the arrival of the national Messiah 
but on a world redeemer, and with it, on a telos and termination of history. 
Hellenism was made possible by the long journey from myth to logos in the 
Greek Enlightenment. One of its lasting achievements was an understanding 
of the unwritten ethical laws (the nomoi ágraphoi) that stand above the 
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written ones. The theologian Rudolf Bultmann, the founder of the 
demythologizing interpretation of the New Testament, described early 
Christianity as a syncretic phenomenon that combined Hellenism with Jewish 
and classical Greek traditions.4 From Stoicism came the idea of a single 
human community and the theory of natural law; from Gnosticism came the 
clear distinction between God and world.  
The classic instance of the Christian distinction between divine and secular 
orders can be found in the words Jesus delivered to the Pharisees: “Render 
therefore unto Caesar the things which be Caesar’s, and unto God the things 
which be God’s.”5 This pronouncement not only rejects theocracy; it also 
anticipates secularization and emancipation. The differentiation between 
divine and worldly rule signified both a limitation and a confirmation of the 
secular domain. It was a limitation because secular rule had no control over 
the sphere of religion; it was a confirmation because the distinction afforded 
an independent sphere to the secular world. 
1,000 years lay between Jesus’s reply to the Pharisees and the initial 
separation of spiritual and worldly powers in the Investiture Controversy of 
the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries. In retrospect, this fundamental 
separation can be seen as the impetus for the separation of powers in general. 
The second separation of powers came with the Magna Charta, in 1215, which 
introduced a distinction between princely powers exercised by the monarch 
and the estate powers exercised by nobility, clergy, and city burghers. Each 
separation of powers that took place in the Middle Ages was restricted to the 
region of the Western Church. The Eastern Church lacked the dualism 
between Pope and monarch, and, as a result, spiritual power remained 
                                                        
4 Rudolf Bultmann, Primitive Christianity in its Contemporary Setting, trans. R. H. Fuller (New 
York: Meridian Books, 1957). 
5 Matthew 22: 21; Mark 12:17; Luke 20:25. 
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subservient to worldly power. Moreover, estates in the Western sense that 
could challenge the ruler never developed. Unlike the West, the East knew 
neither mutual loyalty between territorial lords and feudal nobility nor 
independent cities nor a self-assured class of city burghers nor a tradition of 
individual and corporative freedom.  
 The history of the West is not a history of uninterrupted advance toward 
ever-greater levels of freedom. The Reformation, in the 16th century, did bring 
a massive increase of freedom by elevating individual conscience to the status 
of supreme moral authority. Yet the Lutheran and Anglican state church also 
brought coercion and a return to the religious intolerance that the Humanists 
had fought against. In England, such restrictions elicited the protest of 
Calvinist nonconformists. From this resistance developed a democratic 
movement on the other side of the Atlantic. There, it soon became strong 
enough for American colonists of the new West to revolt against England. 
In the old West, England was still the freest of Europe’s major countries. The 
medieval separation of powers between princely and estate power developed 
there into the modern separation of legislative, executive, and judicial 
power—the separation of powers that found its classical expression in 
Montesquieu’s 1748 The Spirit of Laws. Together with the ideas of inalienable 
human rights, the rule of law, and representative democracy, the separation 
of powers made up the core part of the Western world’s community of values. 
And it is these values on which the normative project of the West is 
grounded.  
The normative project of the West was not an invention of the Enlightenment. 
Its roots, like those of the Enlightenment itself, reach far back to the Middle 
Ages and Antiquity. What is more, the normative project of the West has 
never been a purely European affair. Transatlantic cooperation has played an 
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important role as well. The first human rights declarations were drafted on 
British colonial soil in North America, the first being the Virginia Declaration 
of Rights, signed into law on June 12, 1776. These declarations critically 
shaped the Declaration of Rights of Man and of the Citizen, which France’s 
National Constituent Assembly adopted on August 26, 1789. Both the Atlantic 
revolutions of the eighteenth century—the American revolution of 1776 and 
the French revolution of 1789—articulated the normative project of the West 
in its essential idea. This idea was the standard by which the West could 
measure itself and had to measure itself.  
Two centuries would have to pass before all Western nations committed 
themselves to this project. The history of the nineteenth and the twentieth 
centuries is largely informed by the struggle to accept or reject the ideas of 
1776 and 1789. Many Western countries revolted against these ideas in the 
name nationalism, itself a product of Western modernity in many respects. 
The most radical of these revolts was Germany’s, which cumulated in 
National Socialism, and is brilliantly analyzed in Ralf Dahrendorf’s 1965 
Society and Democracy in Germany. The countries of East Central Europe, for 
their part, were unable to rejoin the Old Occident until after the fall of 
communism. 
As these examples show, one distinctive feature of the West’s Westernization 
is its asynchronous character. Another feature of the West, no less striking, is 
the discrepancy between idea and practice. Some of the drafters of the first 
human rights declaration and the American declaration of independence 
were slave owners, among them Thomas Jefferson. Had the opponents of 
slavery insisted on its abolition, the attempt to gain independence from 
British rule would have failed. Nevertheless, the promise on which the United 
States was founded had revolutionary implications: if, according to the 
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Declaration of Independence, quote “all men are created equal, endowed by 
their Creator with certain unalienable Rights,” then slavery was a scandal 
whose elimination was both historically and morally necessary. In the long 
battle to outlaw slavery, principles eventually prevailed over practice. Cynical 
as the West’s treatment of the non-Western world may have been, it retained 
the ability of self-criticism, enabling it to make corrections and improvements 
that would advance its normative project. 
The Afro-American slaves were not the only group to be denied their 
inalienable rights. The native people of North America and Australia were 
driven to the verge of extermination, while large segments of the white 
population suffered sustained discrimination. It took many years before 
women achieved equality, while workers faced a long, sometimes violent, 
struggle in their quest for civil rights and a dignified existence. Both women 
and workers appealed to the promises of 1776 and 1789. From those promises 
they forged weapons in the battle against an often recalcitrant reality.  
On the eve of World War I, just over a dozen Western states were, broadly 
speaking, “representative democracies”: the U.S., Great Britain, France, the 
Scandinavian nations, Switzerland, Holland, Belgium, Luxemburg, Italy, 
Spain, Australia, and New Zealand. Their shortcomings on this score all 
concerned suffrage. Prior to 1914, only New Zealand (in 1893) and Finland (in 
1906) had granted women the right to vote. Universal and equal suffrage for 
men was widespread by that time, but even that had not taken hold 
everywhere. The Netherlands didn’t give equal weight to all male voters until 
1917. Great Britain finally got around to in 1918. Belgium und Luxemburg 
waited until 1919. France until 1944. 
In Germany, equal and universal suffrage for men had been in effect for much 
longer. The North German Confederation introduced it in 1867, and the 
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German Reich adopted it in 1871. But despite being progressive when it came 
to male suffrage, the German Reich founded by Bismarck was not a 
representative democracy: The leadership answered to the Kaiser, not the 
Reichstag. Not until October 1918 did the transition from constitutional to 
parliamentary monarchy take place. This coincidence of democracy and 
military defeat would severely handicap the viability of the Weimar Republic. 
In England, where the parliamentary system preceded the gradual 
introduction of universal and equal suffrage, politics developed without the 
radical breaks experienced by Germany. 
In France, things were different. At the time of the 1789 revolution, France did 
not have a long parliamentary tradition. Before it established the 
parliamentary democracy of the Third Republic in the years after 1870, France 
would go through numerous regime changes and tumultuous internal crises.  
Italy and Spain developed into parliamentary democracies before 1914—
provided one takes parliamentary accountability and universal male suffrage 
as the criteria for parliamentary democracy. In both countries, the political 
system suffered from backward social structures and widespread illiteracy. 
Portugal was even more behind in this regard. Even after the monarchy was 
abolished, in 1910, only a small minority of the male population was able to 
vote. In another region of the old Occident, that of the Habsburg monarchy, 
members of the House of Deputies in the Reichsrat were elected based on 
universal male suffrage starting in 1907. But by 1914, the Donau monarchy 
was governed by emergency decrees. This was Vienna’s preferred method 
when opposition among the nationalities paralyzed the work of the Reichsrat.    
In the new Occident on the other side of the Atlantic, there were two 
democracies already in existence by 1914: the United States, which was the 
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world’s largest at the time, and the British dominion of Canada. None of the 
larger Latin American republics developed a level of democratic stability 
before 1914 that was comparable with that of U.S. or Canada. Instead, the 
region was characterized by violent regime change, civil war, and 
caudillismo, a more or less dictatorial rule of a political leader backed by the 
military. 
In 1914, the Europeans and the Americans controlled most of the colonial 
world. By then, there were clear indications that the white expansion had 
already reached its peak. Japan’s defeat of Imperial Russian, in 1905, was a 
signal to the white world and the nonwhite world alike. The victory of Japan 
over one of the great European powers encouraged the national movement in 
the largest English colony of the time, namely India. Another unmistakable 
sign came nine years before when Ethiopian troops delivered a crushing 
defeat to the Italians at Adwa. Like Germany, Italy was a latecomer to 
nationhood and colonial power. And like Germany, though more modest in 
its aims than Germany, Italy was driven by the desire to have its own place in 
the sun. 
Before 1914, there were only two colonial empires that deserved the name: the 
British and the French. Other European states possessed colonies, but what 
they possessed did not add up to an empire. The United States, founded on 
an anti-colonial revolution, became a colonial power in the Philippines after it 
captured Manila, in 1898. But the experience of war on the once Spanish-
controlled islands was the main reason the U.S. did not seek to expand its 
colonial power any further. Most subsequent efforts on the part of the U.S. to 
reach beyond its national borders were limited to informal hegemony—a 
tactic invented by Great Britain several decades before. 
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World War I represented one of the starkest breaks in the history of the West. 
Sixty-five years later, in 1979, the American historian and diplomat George F. 
Kennen called it “the great seminal catastrophe of this century.”6 This 
assessment is one that Poland, the Czech Republic, and other nations who 
owed their independence to the war would probably have rejected without 
further qualification. World War I was an internal conflict among Western 
nations, and the severest up to that point. But it was also a conflict with non-
Western powers on both sides. In the camp of Western democracy stood 
Russia, Japan, and starting in 1917, China. In the camp of the Central Powers 
stood the Ottoman Empire. It was evident from the beginning that the war’s 
outcome would affect not only the global balance of power but also the future 
of the West’s normative project. A victory of Germany and its allies would 
have been a defeat of the ideas of 1776 and 1789. Whether a victory of the 
Western powers would help those ideas triumph was, at the time, uncertain 
due to the unpredictability of Russia’s trajectory. 
Historians tend to speak of a “long nineteenth century” and a “short 
twentieth century.” They usually begin the long nineteenth century in 1776, 
with the American Revolution, or in 1789, with the French Revolution and 
end it in 1914 or 1917. They date the short twentieth century from 1914 or 
1917 to the fall of the Soviet Union between 1989 and 1991.  
Those who employ these time frames tend to neglect the dramatic changes 
that occurred in the middle of the nineteenth century. Contrary to accepted 
opinion, the revolutions of 1848 and 1849 deeply changed Europe. As 
Reinhart Koselleck rightly observed, these revolutions were the first and the 
last revolutions to envelop all of Europe.7 In them, the old West ran up against 
                                                        
6 George F. Kennan, The Decline of Bismarck’s European Order: Franco-Russian Relations, 1875–
1890, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 3.   
7 Reinhart Koselleck, “Wie europäisch waren die Revolutionen von 1848/49?” in Europäische 
Umrisse deutscher Geschichte: Zwei Essays (Manutius: Heidelberg, 1999), 23 [9–36]. 
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its old eastern boundaries once again. Only one non-Western, orthodox 
country—Romania—took part, and its involvement was brief. The 1848 
Treaty of Guadelupe Hidalgo granted the United States a new western 
boundary, extending its territory to the Pacific Ocean. Shortly thereafter, the 
discovery of rich gold and silver deposits in California, as well as in Mexico 
and Australia, triggered a powerful surge in industrialization and 
globalization. The 1850s would see the triumph of positivism, materialism, 
and the theory of evolution. The chapter of idealism, which had once 
predominated in Europe, came to a close in the intellectual history of the 
West. Moreover, many events took place that would shape the development 
of Europe and America: The Crimean War, which took place between 1854 
and 1856, revolutionized the European state system. It sharpened the 
opposition between Britain and Russia; it exploded the conservative bloc 
made up of Russia, Austria, and Prussia; it strengthened Prussia at the 
expense of Austria; and it forged close cooperation between the Second 
French Empire and the Kingdom of Sardinia-Piedmont.  
At the end of the 1850s, the unsolved problems of the revolutions of 1848 and 
1849 overflowed first into Italy and then into Germany. Compounding those 
problems was the question of unity, which was on the agenda once again. 
This cluster of issues would determine European politics until Italy and 
Germany became nations in the Franco-Prussian War, between 1870 and 1871. 
On the other side of the Atlantic, as America grew and took on new states, it 
had to confront a fateful question: how to resolve the conflict between slave-
owning and non-slave-owning states. The American Civil War, fought from 
1861 to 1865, cast its shadow in advance.   
Between 1850 and 1914, movements and ideologies formed that would shape 
the twentieth century. The ideas of Marxism spread among European 
workers. After the turn of the century, Marxism split into two camps, one that 
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sought to reach its goal through the dictatorship of the proletariat and another 
that elevated the social advance of democracy to the status of a mission. 
Nationalism experienced a functional shift that went hand in hand with a 
change in the social strata who bore it: From a weapon used by the emergent 
bourgeoisie to fight the forces of the status quo came an instrument in the 
rightwing struggle against the internationalist left.  
The “integral nationalism” that emerged in France at the turn of the century, 
often in combination with modern antisemitism, paved the way for fascism. 
The conflict between the divided left and the fascist movement was to leave 
its mark on the period between the world wars. In the colonies, by contrast, 
nationalism was a weapon of emancipation. It didn’t experience wide-scale 
success until after 1945, but by 1918 it was dangerous enough to cause serious 
concerns for the colonial powers. 
In Max Weber’s famous prefatory remarks to his 1920 Collected Essays in the 
Sociology of Religion, he identified several cultural phenomena that he claimed 
were only found in the Occident and that he characterized as typically 
Western: empirical-based science, rational harmonic music, legal formalism, 
an expert class, capitalism’s unbounded desire to acquire, a separation of 
household and business, rational business bookkeeping, a bourgeoisie, the 
organization of free work, and a rational socialism. The common denominator 
was the rationality of its economics and its way of life in general.8 
Weber’s analysis identified stages of the modernization process that Western 
societies formed by industry and bureaucracy had undergone and in parts 
were still undergoing. Curiously, he did not speak of the normative and 
                                                        
8 Max Weber, “Prefatory Remarks to Collected Essays in the Sociology of Religion,” in The 
Protestant Ethic and the “Spirit” of Capitalism and Other Writings, trans. Peter Baehr and Gordon 
C. Wells (New York: Penguin Books, 2002), 356–72.  
ix  Ralf Dahrendorf, “Europe and the West: Old and New Identities” (lecture,  Institute of Directors, 
London, May 21, 2003). Later published in the Bulletin of the German Historical Institute London 
25, no.2 (2003): 6–16.  
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political achievements of the West: human rights, civil rights, the separation 
of powers, popular sovereignty, and representative democracy. For Weber, 
apparently, these cultural phenomena were no typical features of the 
Occident. This was a very German point of view, and it was already outdated 
in 1920. Today, there are good reasons to see the development of normative 
standards, a culture of self-criticism, and a pluralistic civil society as the 
centrepieces of Western history.  
Max Weber wrote his preface shortly after the end of the World War I. This 
war, history’s worst outburst of national antagonisms at the time, 
revolutionized the international state system more than the societies 
themselves. On the whole, the old European West emerged from this bloody 
conflict weaker, while the new American West emerged stronger. Starting in 
1917, the West was challenged by the Soviet Union, which owed its existence 
to the war. Nazi Germany, its diametrical opposite, developed after 1933. On 
account of the aggression it showed both sides, Germany forced East and 
West into a coalition against it and its Allies, Italy and Japan. After the defeat 
of the Axis powers in World War II, the alliance collapsed, and a new East-
West conflict emerged that would determine Europe and the world for four-
and-a-half decades. As with World War II, it demanded the end of 
colonization, the end of a four-century-long era of European rule over large 
parts of Asia and almost all of Africa. 
After 1991, when NATO lost its opponent in the Cold War, many asked what 
the West now stood for. After the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, most 
everyone understood that these attacks were directed against the West in 
general, not just the United States. The way the U.S. reacted to 9/11 made 
some Europeans doubt whether the Western community of values still 
existed. Yet whatever doubts Europeans may harbour, large parts of the non-
Greatness and Limits of the West 
 
16
Western world continue to see the West as a unity, in particular those who 
hate it. 
After the fall of the Soviet Union, some Western observers believed it was 
only a matter of time before the ideas of the West took hold everywhere. It is 
true: certain products of the West—capitalism, industrialization, sovereign 
national states and legal systems, democratic majority rule—were adopted by 
many non-Western societies, and such Westernization, or partial 
Westernization, may continue to occur. Yet the West has long stopped 
dominating the world. Now it is one form of life and politics among others. 
The nations that understand themselves as part of the West make up only a 
minor portion of the world’s population. 
For all that, the West’s claim that certain rights are inalienable is also a claim 
that they are universal. Until these rights are acknowledged universally the 
world over, the normative project of the West will remain unfinished. This 
project represents the West’s greatest invention. It is that which lends it 
historical greatness and holds it together at the core, all contradictions 
notwithstanding. The best the West can do to disseminate its values is to 
adhere to them while keeping a critical eye on its past violations. This history 
teaches us that without human rights, the separation of powers, and the rule 
of law all communities face serious risks sooner or later. Of course, people 
cannot be forced to accept this truth. Even some Western countries were long 
in taking it to heart. Germany was certainly one of them. 
The normative project of the West was, as I stressed at the beginning, the 
issue that mattered most to Ralf Dahrendorf. At the talk he gave for the 
German Historical Institute London in 2003, he reaffirmed his deep 
commitment to that project. I would like to end my talk today with his words: 
[Quote] “I . . . remain a Westerner before I am a European, and while some of 
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my American friends may be Americans first, no definition of this identity 
can ignore that its underlying values are Western. . . .  If one does not like the 
word “Western,” one can describe them as those of the liberal order, though 
they began their career as the values of the West. . . . In any case, the time has 
come to reassert the values of such an order. Perhaps we need a new West 
which engages in joint projects of peace and prosperity in freedom.”9 
                                                        
9 Ralf Dahrendorf, “Europe and the West: Old and New Identities” (lecture,  Institute of Directors, 
London, May 21, 2003). Later published in the Bulletin of the German Historical Institute London 
25, no.2 (2003): 6–16. 
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